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In this paper we consider the impact of vertical integration on a retailer's choices of product
variety and specific, brand-supporting investment. In an incomplete contract environment,
vertical merger encourages investment in integrated supply, and foreclosure of non-integrated
manufacturers. Anti-competitive as opposed to efficiency interpretations depend delicately on
a trade-off between the benefits of supplier-specific rather than generally applicable retailer
investment, and the value of multi-product rather than single product retailing. Where retailers
compete, it is shown that vertical integration implements competition reducing, product
differentiating investment strategies.
Keywords: incomplete contracts, vertical integration, monopolization
JEL classification: L22, L12, L41. Introduction
Do vertical mergers enhance efficiency or promote market power? A vigorous debate has
raged between proponents of the rival efficiency and anti-competitive viewpoints. Much of this
attention has focused on the possibility of integration-induced market foreclosure. Indeed,
such concerns have been prominent in motivating recent activity by competition authorities.
For example, the UK Monopolies and Mergers Commission has, in the last few years,
undertaken major investigations of the beer (1989), petrol (1990) and new motor car (1992)
markets, each of which has involved a significant vertical component.
A strident attack on the anti-competitive case has been provided by Robert Bork. He argues
strongly that "the law against vertical merger is merely a law against the creation of
efficiency" [Bork (1978), p.234]. The view that vertical merger will lead to distortion in the
supply and purchase prices faced by non-integrated rivals is dismissed. Integration is seen as
an efficient response to transaction cost concerns. Oliver Williamson, too, takes this view that
economising on transaction costs is "the main purpose served" by vertical integration
[Williamson (1985), p.85-86].
In response to this challenge, a number of recent papers have attempted to set the anti-
competitive perspective on a firmer theoretical foundation. A radical approach, was initiated in
an important paper by Patrick Bolton and Michael Whinston [Bolton and Whinston (1993)].
Their argument strikes at the transaction cost basis that underlies much of the benign view of
vertical merger. Building on the incomplete contract approach to integration formulated in
Grossman and Hart (1986), they show that the very investment incentive effects that
encourage efficient vertical integration in a bilateral context can lead to inefficiency in a
multilateral environment. When a capacity-constrained monopoly supplier integrates with one
of its buyers, over-investment in the internal relationship is encouraged. This distorts supply
patterns, and may lead to inefficient foreclosure of non-integrated rivals.
In this paper we will adopt the Bolton-Whinston approach, emphasising the importance of
investment specificity considerations in a multilateral context. Whereas Bolton and Whinston
focus on supply assurance motives for integration, when essential input supplies may be
limited, we consider the impact of vertical merger on a retailer's choices of product variety and
brand-supporting investment.
1 Integration encourages single product as opposed to multi-
product retailing, and product-specific rather than generally applicable investment. The
interaction between efficiency and anti-competitive interpretations depends delicately on the
trade-off of these effects. Unlike Bolton-Whinston (1993), the effects of vertical integration on
1 Chandler (1959) contrasts the supply assurance motives for integration in extractive
industries with those in consumer goods, and to a lesser extent finished producers' goods
industries.product market competition are also considered. In this context, our specificity emphasis is
illuminating. We show that, by encouraging product-differentiating investment, vertical
integration can effectively reduce inter-retailer competition. Such reductions in competition do
not rely on foreclosure effects.
Though rarely involving full vertical integration into retailing, the UK motor car industry is
characterised by long-term contractual relationships between manufacturers and independent
dealers. These contracts generally impose some form of brand exclusivity on dealers, but often
offer territorial protection from intra-brand competition in exchange. Manufacturers argue that
such restrictions are essential in motivating brand-specific investment by retailers. They claim
that managerial effort and capacity constraints generally limit the effectiveness of multi-brand
dealerships. We model such investment effects explicitly in the paper.
In their 1992 report, the Monopolies and Mergers Commission recognises that exclusivity
clauses do limit the ability of weaker brands to access dealer networks i.e. these brands suffer
from market foreclosure. Anti-competitive effects on inter-brand competition are recognised.
2
The efficiency trade-off between motivating specific investment and foreclosure is at the heart
of our analysis.
The car manufacturers claim vigorous inter-dealer, inter-brand competition. Furthermore, they
argue that the specific investments induced by strong vertical ties, highlighted above,
contribute positively to ensuring a healthy competitive environment. In contrast, we show in
this paper that vertical integration may serve as an effective mechanism for implementing
competition-reducing investment strategies.
We consider a simple setting where a retailer can be supplied by either one or two
differentiated manufacturers. The retailer must make three sequential decisions: (i) whether to
integrate with one of the suppliers, (ii) whether its technology should be largely specific to a
single supplier or flexible, and (iii) whether to source product from one or both manufacturers.
In turn, a number of key factors drive the outcome of this decision process: (a) the
(exogenous) cost of merger, (b) the relative supply costs for specific and general technology,
(c) the relative values of single versus multi-product retailing, and (d) the toughness of inter-
retailer competition. We will focus on the interaction between these factors and the retailer's
decisions.
A location framework is a natural setting for our analysis. With the suppliers fixed at opposite
ends of a unit line, the retailer's once-and-for-all location decision represents its investment
choice. A position at either end of the line constitutes investment that is highly specialised
2 It is interesting to note that multi-brand dealerships do occur, but rarely involve brands that
compete head-on.towards a particular manufacturer, while a mid-point location indicates general purpose
investment. Locating at one end of the line minimises the cost of transacting with the adjacent
manufacturer, but maximises the transport costs of exercising the alternative supply option. A
mid-point location ensures the widest range of supply options. Thus, we explicitly model the
specificity dimension that is central to Williamson's approach to contracting [see e.g.
Williamson (1985)].
Throughout our analysis we will adopt an extreme incomplete contracting framework,
generating simple and clear-cut results. In such an environment, where enforceable contracts
on future supply terms cannot be written, an independent retailer may be reluctant to locate at
either end of the line. Once such location commitment is made, the retailer may effectively be
locked-in to a particular supply relationship. Indeed, whenever single-product retailing is
attractive, the independent retailer will always locate at the mid-point of the unit line,
maximising supply options. Yet, in precisely these circumstances, an end-point location will be
efficient, minimising transport costs. Vertical merger may then be attractive, overcoming lock-
in concerns and encouraging adjacent retailer-supplier location. Of course, even then,
integration will only take place if the resulting transport cost benefits outweigh the exogenous
merger costs. However, in this case, when integration is individually attractive it will always
increase overall welfare.
Costly integration will only occur if it leads to a different retailer location decision. This may,
but need not, affect the retailer's product sourcing decision i.e. leading to single product rather
than multi-product retailing. Where this change does occur, the supply market for the non-
integrated manufacturer is foreclosed. Since the integrating parties take no account of such
third party foreclosure effects in deciding to merge, a negative externality results. Clearly,
inefficient foreclosure may therefore occur.
However, foreclosure need not always be inefficient. A move from double sourcing at the mid-
point of the unit line to integrated single-product retailing at the end-point involves a saving on
transport costs. This efficiency gain counteracts the loss of multi-product surplus. Any anti-
competitive conclusion deduced from foreclosure therefore depends delicately on the
resolution of the trade-off between these opposing forces. This trade-off is at the heart of the
model.
In the context of our model, when multi-product retailing is optimal wherever the retailer
locates, the lock-in threat will not materialise. Consequently, the retailer is indifferent to
location in these circumstances. However, integration may still take place, if it results in a
different retailer location decision. Efficiency implications then depend solely on the structure
of transport costs. Privately attractive but inefficient integration may still occur.Our results also hold for a simple re-interpretation of the model, where a monopoly
manufacturer must decide to supply one or two retailers. The potential anti-competitive effects
of integration can then be viewed as impacting on consumers. In this alternative context,
upstream capacity constraints are important for our results to hold. The analogue of single
product purchasing is then single retailer supply, creating a retailing monopoly. Again, vertical
integration may bring about such an exclusive dealing arrangement, where standard
contractual mechanisms fail.
The paper's primary focus is the impact of vertical integration on final market competition. A
second downstream retailer is introduced into the model, allowing the endogenous relationship
between vertical integration and the downstream competitive environment to be explored. We
show that competition considerations may drive the integration process. Competitive
interaction is seen to generate partially integrated equilibria, where integrated and non-
integrated firms co-exist, and chains of integration, where the integration decisions of
individual firms are driven by industry-wide merger activity.
A number of recent papers have also considered the effects of vertical merger on final market
competition - for instance, Salinger (1988), Ordover, Saloner and Salop (1990) and Hart and
Tirole (1990). However, they focus on the impact vertical merger has on supply pricing - both
for the integrating buyer and for non-integrated rivals. In particular, the upstream division of
an integrated firm will internalise the impact on the downstream division of any supply
agreements undertaken. Essentially, in incomplete contract settings where commitment is
difficult if not impossible to enforce, integration substitutes for contractual mechanisms in
implementing bilateral profit maximising pricing behaviour. In contrast, our approach
emphasises the investment implications of integration, and does not hinge on price effects or
on the foreclosure of non-integrated rivals.
The new force driving vertical integration is a desire to alleviate the pressures of downstream
competition. One obvious strategic response is product differentiation (see e.g. Porter (1980)
for a detailed discussion). In the context of our model, a natural means of achieving this is for
the retailers to locate apart, adjacent to suppliers, at opposite ends of the unit line. Making
idiosyncratic, supplier specific investments enables retailers to enhance their "uniqueness".
In his seminal analysis of the emergence of big business in the United States, Alfred Chandler
highlights the vertical dimension in the development of the modern corporation (see e.g.
Chandler (1959) and (1977)]. He details growing benefits to integrated production and
distribution, as manufacturers required increasingly specialised marketing services to support
ever more sophisticated products in the last decades of the 19th century.
3 The scale effects of
3 Examples cited by Chandler include sewing machines (Singer), agricultural machinery
(McCormick) and amateur photography (Eastman Kodak) [see Chandler (1977), Part IV].market expansion, brought about by urban growth and the emerging railway network, are
emphasised as the driving force encouraging coordination within the firm. However, along
with these expansion effects came new competitive pressures too, as the growing transport
infrastructure connected previously distinct markets. Vertical integration into marketing and
distribution, in effecting product differentiation and brand development, was increasingly
recognised as a fruitful response to this tougher competitive environment in consumer goods
industries [Chandler (1959), p. 10-12].
Within our incomplete contract framework, non-integrated, independent retailers will be
reluctant to invest in supplier-specific technology. Instead, they are likely to locate together, at
the centre of the unit line - avoiding lock^in to either manufacturer, but intensifying
downstream competition. Vertical integration of retailer and supplier, by eliminating lock-in
concerns, provides a mechanism for competition-reducing differentiation. The potential anti-
competitive effects of integration are then clear. Retailers can locate apart, at the ends of the
line without fear of hold-up. Furthermore, close location ties between manufacturing and
retailing stages are generated. As discussed already, such vertical linkages are often cited as a
source of advantage in competitive environments. Of course, set against these benefits are the
inevitable costs of integration.
We find that competition considerations may result in integration where it would not
otherwise take place. Partial integration is the industry equilibrium response to moderate levels
of competition. Integration by a subset of retailers is then sufficient to ease competitive
pressures. Other firms can benefit, without incurring the additional costs of merger. However,
as competition intensifies, a differentiation strategy may only succeed if all retailers
participate, implicitly coordinating their actions. Individual integration decisions will then only
be taken in response to (or in anticipation of) wider merger activity. A fully vertically
integrated industry then results.
Our basic model framework is set out in the next section. Our formal analysis is presented in
Section 3. In Section 4 we briefly outline two simple variations to the basic model. The basic
framework is extended in Section 5 to consider the impact of final market competition on
integration incentives.
2. The Basic Model
The basic model involves three interacting firms. A downstream retailer D can stock the
products of two potential suppliers, Ui and U2. The upstream firms produce differentiated
products, represented by their (fixed) locations at the ends of a unit line. Ui is located at 0, U2
at 1. D however can choose its location, L For simplicity we allow it to locate at ^=0 or^=1/2. Model symmetry allows us to ignore the possibility of location at 1=1. If D chooses ^=0
its assets are tailored to Ui supply while a mid-point location ((=\/2) indicates investment in
general technology.
In purchasing product from upstream firms, D must decide whether to source from a single
firm, or both firms. In making its decision the retailer will be influenced by the values of
stocking a unique product line (m) relative to that of stocking product from both upstream
firms (26, or d per product line). We will assume that m > d. Note, however, that either multi-
product or single product retailing may generate greater overall value.
Product must be transported from the upstream supplier to the retailer. The cost of
transporting product from Ui is denoted by ti while the transport cost for L^'s product is t2.
The magnitudes of these transport costs will depend on D's location. We will assume here that
the total transport cost is independent of the volume stocked from a given supplier (but see
Section 4(i)). This cost can therefore be thought of as the set-up cost of stocking a particular
product line.
The cost of transporting supplies over half the unit line is given by t, while the transportation
cost from end to end is t, where t > t. No transport cost is incurred if retailer and supplier
locate together. For example, if D locates at 0 then no costs are incurred in purchasing
product from Ui, but purchasing product from U2 involves a transport cost t. We will assume
that d > t, ensuring that both upstream firms will always be active in the supply market,
irrespective of downstream firm location. Any additional downstream costs are embedded in
the product values, m andd.
For simplicity, we will suppose that D buys product sequentially, in two batches. D receives
sealed bids from both upstream firms to supply each batch. It must then make simple
accept/reject decisions. Given a first batch sourcing decision, the retailer must then decide
whether to stock a single product line, by purchasing the second batch from the same supplier,
or to opt for double sourcing i.e. multi-product retailing, by purchasing the second product
batch from a new supplier. Bidding for the second batch takes place after the first supply
contract has been awarded.
Ours is a world of incomplete contracts in which supply prices and allocations, as well as
location choice, cannot be enforceably specified at T = 0. The idea here is that supply
requirements are uncertain at T=0 and location (quality) can never be verified by an outside
arbiter. Profit sharing agreements between independent firms cannot be implemented either.
4
The only effective T=0 contracts are those conferring asset ownership rights. Such extensive
4 For a discussion of the profit sharing assumption, with and without integration, see Hart
and Tirole (1990).contracting restrictions are, of course, extreme but lead to a particularly clean and simple
formulation of our problem. Note that, in the absence of enforceable price or profit
agreements, exclusive dealing contracts are never attractive to the retailer and will be ignored
in our analysis.
We will consider the effects of vertical integration between the downstream firm and one of
the upstream firms. Model symmetry allows us to restrict attention to the possibility of D-Ui
integration only. Horizontal integration is not permitted, on anti-trust grounds. The integrated
firm is assumed to maximise the joint profits of both its upstream and downstream divisions. A
fixed cost E is incurred in undertaking a vertical merger. This is intended to broadly capture
the legal, bureaucratic and incentive costs of integration. It is relatively simple to generate
such a cost explicitly [see e.g. Williams (1996)], but for simplicity we do not do so here.
At T=l, uncertainty about supply needs is resolved and D decides on a location (to maximise
profits). Supplies are then purchased (T=2). After transporting supplies, the final output is sold
to consumers (T=3) and revenues are realised.
3. Analysis
As a benchmark for our analysis we will first consider efficiency. We assume that the
monopoly downstream firm is able to extract all consumer surplus. In considering efficiency
we can therefore restrict attention to the combined profits of the three firms. The efficiency of
two decisions must be considered - the product sourcing decision and the downstream firm's
location choice.
At each location there is a supply choice. Product can be sourced from Ui alone, yielding
value m-t|. Alternatively, product can be sourced from both upstream firms, generating an
overall profit of 2d-trt2. Note that our assumptions (innocuously) rule out single sourcing
from U2 since ti < t2.
For a given location, efficient sourcing implies combined profits of II*, where:
FI* - maxfm-tt, 2d-ti-t2l.
The efficient choice of D's location, either at 0 or 1/2, must also be considered. We first derive
the efficient supply allocation for a given location, and then determine the efficient location.
5
To ease notation we will drop the location argument, 1Proposition 1 [Efficiency]
(a) For a given location, efficiency implies:
Ui supplies both batches ifti > 2d-m
Uj and Vi supply one batch each ifti < 2d-m
(b) The efficient location choice is given by:
(=0 if2(d- t)< maxim, 2d-1 ]
{=1/2 if2(d - t) > maxim, 2d- i I
Proof:
(a) Our assumption that U < t2 guarantees that it is always optimal to source at least one unit
from Ui. If t2 > 2d - m the value of sourcing both units from Ui (m-ti) exceeds that of double
sourcing (2d-trt2). Clearly if t2 < 2d - m the reverse is true.
(b) If (=0 the transport costs for Ui supply are 0, and for U2 supply are t. Thus efficient
profits are max[m, 2d-t]. Similarly when ^=1/2 both Us have transport costs t so efficient
profits are max[m-t, 2(d-t)]. The efficient location choice is then determined by which of
these expressions is the larger. Since m > m-1 locating at 1/2 is only efficient if 2(d-1) >
max[m, 2d-t]. QED.
Stocking both products as opposed to one involves an additional transport cost (tf). Double
sourcing is optimal only if the added value of multi-product retailing exceeds this cost. If
2d-m < 0, then stocking a single product is a fortiori optimal.
It is important to recognise that, because of changes in transport costs, the efficient sourcing
decision may (but need not) depend on location choice. If 2d-m > t both products will always
be stocked, irrespective of D's location. Transport cost considerations alone then determine
the optimal location - two costs of t, for 1=1/2, being compared with one cost of t for ^=0.
If 21 > t an end-of-line location is optimal, even if product is sourced from both upstream
firms. Clearly, when single sourcing is optimal D should always locate at (=0. Location at
£=1/2 is efficient only if multi-product sourcing is efficient.
Finally, note that if t < 2d-m < t a change in D's location choice from £=1/2 to 1=0 will result
in an efficient switch from double to single sourcing. Choosing ^=0 will then be efficient, if the
transport cost savings (21) exceed the loss of the incremental value of multi-product retailing
(2d-m).
Integration incurs additional costs E and no benefits, for a given location choice. From a first
best perspective, integration is therefore never desirable. However, where D's self-interest
drives its location decision, integration alone may bring about efficient location choice - as we
will see below.The integration and location decisions made in equilibrium will depend on the overall
magnitude of profits and their division among firms. Competition between suppliers clearly
plays a critical role. The following result summarises the outcome of supply competition, for
given retailer location.
Lemma 1 [Supplier Competition]
(a) Sourcing decisions are always efficient given location.
(b) Ui always supplies the first unit, for a price 2d-m-ti
(c) The second unit is supplied by:
U, if2d-m-t2<0
U2 if2d-m-t2 > 0
The price paid is \2d-m-t2\
(d) In the non-integrated case profits are given by:
nD = m-d + min[m-d, d-t2]
X\y] = max[2d-m-ti, t2-tij
T\[I2 - max[2d-m-t2, 0]
In the integrated case profits are given by:
UU1-D = m-tj-E
Tlu2 = max[2d-m-t2, 0]
Proof: See Appendix.
The basis for the above results is the fact that the upstream firm with the higher value supply
can always undercut its rival, and will do so. The supply prices are determined by the value of
D's best alternative i.e. by the second highest value supply option. If product is sourced from
both Us, then D's outside option in negotiating with either supplier is a switch to single
sourcing. The differential value added is then m-(2d-t2). In our basic model this is independent
of transport costs. The supplier captures the residual value.
Where product is sourced from a single supplier (always Ui in our model) then D's outside
option, and hence its total share of trade value, is m-t2. This is the value of exclusive sourcing
from U2. The result is driven by the perfect foresight of suppliers during the supply process. In
dealing with Ui, D's threat point is U2 supply. Such trade would yield D a payoff of d-t2 for a
single unit, and m-t2 for two units. Clearly if one unit were to be bought from U2 then Ui could
win the competition for the supply of the second unit by offering D a share m-d of trade, again
yielding D an overall profit of m-t2.10
Given that an identical supply competition is used with integration, supply price and allocation
are independent of this decision.
6 Thus, for a particular location, integration does not alter
trade returns (though integration costs E are incurred). The impact of integration therefore
arises from induced changes in D's location choice. It is to this that we now turn.
Lemma 2 [Location]
(a) Under non-integration D chooses location (=112 if 2d-m < ~t and is indifferent about
location otherwise.
(b) The integrated firm always locates at (=0.
Proof:
(a) Non-integration: D chooses location to maximise F1D = m-d + min[m-d, d-t2].
Clearly locating at f.=0, thus maximising d-t2 can never be strictly profitable. Indeed if m-d >
d-t > d-t or d-t > m-d > d-t then D locates at l=\/2 in maximising min[m-d, d-t2].
However, if m-d < d-1 < d- t then min[m-d, d-t2] = m-d, and location is irrelevant.
(b) Integration: D's location is now chosen to maximise TlD_m = m-ti-E.
Clearly this entails minimising ti, i.e. choosing (=0. QED.
In the non-integrated case D chooses its location to maximise downstream profits only. When
product is sourced from both upstream firms, D's share of the profit on each supply contract is
determined by the incremental outside option value of single sourcing, m-d. Since this value is
independent of transport costs, location choice is irrelevant in this case. Where D opts for
single sourcing (always from Ui given our assumptions) its share of profits is m-t2 i.e. the
value of the U2 sourcing alternative. Clearly downstream profit maximisation then involves
minimising the costs of U2 supply. D2 will therefore choose ^=l/2.
7 Though £=l is not
permitted in our model, symmetry and the adverse consequences of lock-in to U2 would
render this option unattractive to D in any event.
In the integrated case, the effects of D's location choice on Ui's profits are internalised. D will
locate at i=O. Lock-in to Ui is no longer a concern, simply involving a transfer between
divisions of the integrated enterprise. Internal transport costs are then minimised. Note that
since additional transport costs are not incurred on incremental product volume, the location
decision is never driven by attempts to raise D's share the value of trade with non-integrated
U2 (but see Section 4(i)).
6 We therefore concur with Bork that "the real cost of any transfer from the manufacturing
unit to the retailing unit includes the return that could have been made on a sale to an
outsider".
7 Note that, in our formulation, the non-integrated D is concerned only with its outside
option. It considers the efficiency consequences of its actions for the second best supply
value, not the value of realised supply. This is, of course, an extreme formulation. In
general bargaining between the buyer and supplier will result in a sharing of the efficiency
gains. Some of the externality effect observed in our model would then be internalised.Where the non-integrated D locates at ^=1/2, integration always brings about a change in
location choice. However, in the case where the non-integrated D is indifferent about location
no such prediction can be made.
Proposition 2 [Integration]
(a) Ui and D will integrate if this changes D's location choice and E < t .
(b)IfE> t ,D and Ui will never integrate.
Proof:
If integration does not result in a change in location, then the sole effect is to reduce the
combined D-Ui profit by the merger cost, E.
If integration changes D's location choice (from £=1/2 to i=0) then D-Ui's gains are given by:
nu-Dl(^=°)" nm(£=l/2) - nD1(«=l/2) = m-E - m-1 = t - E
Then D and Ui have a strict incentive to integrate iff E < t. QED.
Integration is attractive only if it will lead to a change in D's location decision, from t=1/2 to
£=0. The cost of internal supply is then reduced by t. For integration to be worthwhile this
cost saving must exceed the merger cost, E. Clearly if no change in location, and therefore no
transport cost gain, is forthcoming, then integration will never proceed.
In making the integration decision, Ui and D consider their own future joint profits only.
Integration may therefore impose a negative externality on the non-integrated upstream firm
U2. There are two mechanisms by which this can occur.
First, consider the case where U2 always supplies one unit, irrespective of D's location. D's
share of the gains from such trade, driven by its outside option, is then always m-d. The
upstream firm collects the residual profit, 2d-m-t2, and therefore bears the full increase in
transport costs (t - I;) if D changes its location decision from I = 1/2 to I = 0.
The transport costs induced by the integrated D's location decision can, in addition, affect
supply patterns. In particular, D may utilise U2 as a source of supply when located at 1/2, but
rely exclusively on Ui when I =0 is chosen. In this case, if integration induces a change in D's
location decision, it will result in foreclosure of Ws sales.
From a first best perspective, integration is never efficient since it involves a merger cost E.
However, recognising that integration may be necessary to induce efficient location choice,
merger may improve welfare in equilibrium. Clearly, when the non-integrated retailer makes
an efficient location choice, integration can never be welfare-improving.Proposition 3 [Welfare and Integration]
(a) If 21 -E < 2d-m < t then any vertical integration that occurs will reduce welfare.
<(b)lf2t-E < 2d-m and the retailer locates efficiently when indifferent, then any integration
that takes place will reduce overall surplus
Proof:
(a) The integrated retailer always locates at £=0. From Proposition 1, integration only takes
place if E < t and the non-integrated retailer locates at £=1/2.
21 - E < 2d-m => 21 - (2d-m) < E < t => m-d < d-1.
Consequently the non-integrated firm double sources at £=1/2.
Surplus from integration, and subsequent location at £=0 equals max[m, 2d-1 ] - E.
Surplus from non-integration and location at £=1/2 equals 2(d-1).
Now 2d-m < f implies m > 2d-1 therefore integration is inefficient if 2(d-1) > m-E , i.e. if
2d-m>2t-E.
(b) Where double sourcing occurs irrespective of location then D is indifferent about location.
If it then locates efficiently, integration (at cost E) must reduce surplus. From (a) we know
that, if 21 -E < 2d-m then double sourcing is optimal at I1/2 and a switch to single sourcing at
£=0 is welfare reducing. QED.
When single sourcing is optimal at £=0, the non-integrated retailer will locate at £=1/2. Where
this takes place, integration, in shifting location from £=1/2 to 0, can only be inefficient if it
affects U2's profits (i.e. it has externality effects). This will only be the case if double sourcing
occurs at £=1/2. A switch from double sourcing at £=1/2 to single sourcing at £0 generates a
clear transport cost saving (2t). However, a merger cost E is incurred, and the benefits of
multi-product retailing (2d-m) are lost. Merger is inefficient if the costs outweigh the benefits.
Suppose that single sourcing is everywhere optimal. A non-integrated retailer will then always
locate at £=1/2, though location at £=0 is efficient. Nevertheless, vertical integration that
brings about a change in downstream location decision would not always increase welfare. To
be specific, if E > t merger costs exceed transport cost savings. Of course, where single
sourcing is optimal irrespective of location, inefficient integration never takes place, since all
welfare effects are internalised by D and U|.
If double sourcing is optimal at every location the non-integrated retailer will be indifferent
about location. The efficient location minimises overall transport costs. If 2t > t then
location at £=0 is efficient, while location at £=1/2 is optimal if I > 21 .Of course, if the
indifferent retailer always chooses the efficient location then integration can generate no
benefit, and involves ah added cost E.13 Bibhofhefe
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Our analysis has suggested that integration may well cause a switch from double to single
sourcing. The market for IVs product is then effectively foreclosed. We will now address the
question of whether such foreclosure is inefficient.
Proposition 4 [Foreclosure]
Conditional on integration:
(a) Foreclosure occurs if t < 2d-m < t.
(b) This foreclosure is inefficient if 2t < 2d-m.
Proof:
(a) Under non-integration D is supplied by both U's if m-d < d-1.
When integrated D locates at ^=0 and is supplied by Ul only if m-d > d-1.
Combining these conditions proves (a).
(b) Foreclosure yields overall profits m. Since the integrated film locates at ^=0 there are no
transport costs for D,. Therefore from the efficiency results above, this is inefficient if
m < 2(d-1). Rearranging gives (b). QED.
Where it takes place, integration changes D's location decision from (,=\/2 to (=0. Foreclosure
results if supply patterns are sensitive to location choice. This will be the case if double
sourcing occurs at l=M2 i.e. m-d < d-1, while single sourcing is efficient for <?=0 i.e. m-d > d-
t. The benefits of multi-product retailing must therefore be sensitive to transport costs.
For a given location choice, the downstream firm's sourcing decision is always efficient. In
considering the efficiency of foreclosure we therefore focus on the following question: Given
that a change in location choice from ^=1/2 to i=0 will result in foreclosure of U2, does such a
move maximise overall profits? Single sourcing at (=0 involves no transport costs, while
double sourcing at ^=1/2 incurs transport costs of 2t. For foreclosure to be efficient, these
cost savings must exceed the lost value of multi-product retailing, 2d-m.
Comparing Propositions 3 and 4 it is worth noting that the efficiency of integration does not
hinge on foreclosure effects. Suppose double sourcing is optimal at all locations and the non-
integrated retailer locates at t.=\l2. Integration then brings about a change in location, but no
foreclosure. Depending on the structure of transport costs, this may or may not bring about
efficient location. Note also that foreclosure-inducing integration can be efficient.14
4 Variations and Extensions to the Basic Model
i) Unit transport costs
An obvious variation on our basic model is to impose a transport cost per batch supplied by
upstream firms. This contrasts with the basic setup, where a single transport cost is incurred
per product line.
D's profits in this case can be obtained by simple adaption of the basic model results. Where
double sourcing occurs, D's outside option is the single sourcing alternative. Of course this
option now involves an additional cost, since a transport cost is incurred on both batches. D is
thus able to extract m-d-t2 from supplier Ui and m-d-ti from supplier U2 (cf. basic model
results). Downstream profits are therefore given by 2(m-d)-(ti+t2). Where D opts for single
sourcing (from Ui) the outside option of sourcing from U2 now has value m-2t2.
Now, when D finds double sourcing attractive at all locations, it is in general no longer
indifferent about that location. To see this, note that D's profit is given by 2(m-d)-(ti+t2). The
retailer therefore aims to minimise ti+t2. Where t < 21 it is clear that D will prefer to choose
(=0. Though such a location increases D's lock-in to Ui (by reducing the value of the U2 single
sourcing option by t -1), this is offset by an increase of t in D's outside option when dealing
with U2. Conversely, when t > 21, D prefers to locate at <?=l/2. Only when t = 21 will D
now be indifferent to location choice.
Where a location choice of (=0 results from single sourcing, the non-integrated D will no
longer always locate at ^=1/2. In particular, this may not be so when single sourcing is optimal
at ^=0, but double sourcing is optimal at (=\/2. In the basic model, when such circumstances
prevail, location at ^=1/2 dominates. The key to this is to note that where single sourcing
prevails a mid-point location is clearly optimal. However, when double sourcing occurs the
value of the single sourcing option is independent of location. On introducing a per batch
transport cost, the single sourcing option for the second batch is now transport cost
dependent. Location at i=l/2 is no longer a dominant action for D.
When a per batch transport cost is incurred, this additional cost is always passed on to the
downstream firm. Profits for the U-D] combination are therefore given by n^.y] = m-2ti.
Where integration affects the location decision, it will therefore be optimal in a wider range of
circumstances i.e. integration will now occur when a change in location is induced and
E<2t.
Note that this profit expression holds irrespective of which supplier D trades with. Where
integrated D trades with U2 there is an additional incentive to locate at 1=0. The reduction in15
the transport costs of internal supply (by Ui) is of value not only when internal sourcing
actually occurs, but also when supplies are sourced externally from U2. In such cases, by
raising the value of D's (internal) outside option, locating at ^=0 increases D's share of external
trade profits:
8 Note that this effect is absent in our basic model above since there the value of
a second unit of supply from a given supplier is not affected by additional transport costs, and
hence by location choice.
ii) Upstream monopoly
A simple re-interpretation of the basic model allows us to consider a scenario where a
monopoly upstream firm supplies competing downstream firms. The results derived above
hold for this case too. However it is then vital that the single supplier is capacity constrained.
A downstream firm, by securing all upstream output, can then be sure that it monopolises the
downstream market. Of course, to achieve this a downstream firm must outbid its rival for all
supply capacity. Thus a downstream firm may (inefficiently) purchase all upstream capacity to
secure downstream monopoly, even though a single unit is sufficient for its production needs.
In the absence of such capacity constraints (and given the impossibility of exclusive dealing
contracts) the upstream supplier cannot guarantee either downstream firm a monopoly
position. Indeed the supplier would always have an incentive, having supplied one retailer on
monopoly terms, to proceed to supply the other firm. Foreseeing this outcome, competition
for supplies disappears, and with it so does supplier profit.
This effect is precisely that highlighted by Hart and Tirole (1990) in their first model. A non-
integrated upstream firm, with unlimited capacity can never commit to supplying a single
downstream firm. Monopoly profits are fully dissipated. Hart and Tirole show that, in this
context, integration will eliminate upstream incentives to oversupply the downstream market.
Where downstream monopoly is attractive, the integrated upstream supplier has every
incentive to confer that monopoly power on its own downstream subsidiary.
In our model, by contrast, it is the downstream firm that is the monopolist. Since it is the
residual claimant it will not purchase from both suppliers if single sourcing is optimal. The
Hart-Tirole motive for integration is therefore absent in our basic model. Their effect would
re-appear, however, if the retailer sold services to upstream manufacturers, but final sale
revenues were earned directly by the upstream firms.
8 This effect is the driving force behind some of the results in Bolton and Whinston (1990).
See, for example, their Proposition 4.1.16
5. Multiple Retailers
An important development of the basic model involves the introduction of an additional
retailer. Only then can the possibility that both vertically integrated and non-integrated firms
coexist in equilibrium be considered. We will show that such an industry structure can emerge,
even though all downstream and all upstream firms are initially identical.
Secondly, we will be able to consider the endogenous relationship between downstream
competition and vertical integration. A key concern in the anti-trust literature is whether
vertical merger, that leaves horizontal concentration at both upstream and downstream levels
unchanged, can adversely effect competition. In the context of a stylised model of such
competition, we will show that downstream competition can indeed be weakened by
integration. We will also explore the potential existence of chains of integration.
The two upstream firms, Ui and U2, are again located at the ends of the unit line. However,
now two downstream firms, Di and D2, can each locate at either end of the line or mid-way
between the endpoints. We will permit vertical integration between Ui and Di, and between
U2 and D2. U2 and Da's decision to integrate follows that by Ui and Dj. Again a cost E is
incurred .in undertaking a merger. In evaluating the merits of integration, upstream-
downstream pairs aim to maximise their combined profits.
Where a downstream firm is indifferent as to its supply source, we will assume that D;
purchases from Ui. To simplify matters considerably we will also assume that there is no value
to either downstream film in multi-product supply i.e. d=0. In the absence of competition,
each downstream firm will therefore extract surplus m from consumers.
Our stylised model of competition will take the following form. We will suppose that if
downstream firms locate strictly closer than A apart, then competition reduces each firm's
revenues by 8m.
9 Allowing A to vary will enable us to analyse the impact of increasing
downstream competition on integration decisions.
9 Note, in particular, that this competition effect is assumed independent of the levels of
retailers' transport costs. This is natural in our setting, since transport costs are fixed not
(per unit) variable costs. Our analysis of the competition effects of integration will therefore
focus on location effects. In general, integration would also lead to changes in variable
costs that will impact on competition. The costly merger process could then be seen
(partly) as an investment in variable cost reduction. Numerous authors (e.g. Bonanno and
Vickers (1988), Fershtman and Judd (1987)) have shown that the strategic effects of
integration on rivals' behaviour may outweigh the direct cost benefits, rendering vertical
integration unattractive. Vertical separation may then be the optimal response to tougher
competition.t7
A = 0
In this case there is no competition between downstream firms, irrespective of their location
decisions. In such circumstances non-integrated downstream firms always locate at <?=l/2 (see
Figure l(i)). In doing so, they maximise their outside options and hence minimise lock-in to
either upstream supplier. An integrated downstream firm will locate next to its upstream
partner, at the appropriate end of the line (Figure l(iii)). Integration removes lock-in worries
and firms will then seek to eliminate inefficient transport costs. In the absence of competition,
joint retailer-supplier profits are independent of industry-wide integration and location
decisions. Partial Integration will therefore never be observed.
Profits for U-D pairs (A = 0):
Non-Integration: n^.p = m - t
Full Integration: H\j-D = m - E ,
Clearly integration is attractive if and only if the transport cost savings outweigh the fixed cost
of integration i.e. E < t .
0 < A < 1/2
With A > 0 the possibility of downstream competition emerges. In this case, if downstream
firms locate together then competition reduces their revenues by 6m. On the other hand, if
downstream firms locate at least a 1/2 unit apart, competition is avoided.
In the non-integrated case there are now two opposing forces at work. A desire to avoid lock-
in to either upstream supplier drives both downstream firms towards location at £=1/2.
However, countering this, the prospect of competition encourages those downstream firms to
locate apart. Below, we derive the condition for the lock-in effect to dominate.
Lemma 3 [Non-Integrated Location Choice]
If Qm< t -t then non-integrated downstream firms locate at (.=112.
Proof:
Locating at £=1/2 is a dominant strategy for each non-integrated downstream firm.
Suppose first that Dj locates at f=l.
Di's (i * j) profits as a function of location are then given by:
(l-6)m-i at£=l
m - t at (=0
m - t at £=1/2
Clearly locating at €=1/2 maximises downstream profit.18
Suppose now that Dj locates at £=1/2
Di's (i * j) profits for each location are then:
m - t at ^=1
m - t at £=0
(l-6)m-t at ^=1/2
Profit is again maximised at ^=1/2, if (l-8)m - t >m-t i.e. if 6m < t - t. QED.
Locating at one end of the unit line is bad for independent retailer profit, because it reduces
the value of the second best sourcing option. Compared with a mid-point location, the
transport cost incurred with this option increases from t to t. Offsetting this is the potential
value of creating distance between retailors. We will assume that the lock-in effect always
dominates.
Condition A: Qm < t -t .
Note that an integrated downstream firm will always locate next to its upstream subsidiary.
Not only does this location decision minimise transport costs but in addition, by locating away
from ^=1/2, the integrated retailer will avoid competition with any non-integrated downstream
firm. Given Condition A, vertical integration will therefore always lead to a separating of
retailers.
1
0 With competition, the incentives to integrate are increased.
Profits for U-D pairs (0 < A < 1/2 ) are given by:
Non-Integration: ^u-D =(l-9)m-t
Partial Integration (Dj-Uj integrated): nijj.Dj = m-E
Full Integration: n^j.Q = m-E
When E > 9m + t both upstream-downstream pairs will remain unintegrated, since the costs
of integration then outweigh any competition and transport cost benefits. Conversely when
E < t both firms will integrate. However for intermediate E values, where t < E < 9m + t,
we will observe a partially integrated industry structure (see Figure l(ii)). Note that both firms
would prefer that their rival integrated (and located at an end-point) alone. In this way they
would benefit from reduced competition without bearing the necessary costs of integration.
1
0 Dixit (1983) develops a model where the structure of vertical relationships may result in
greater spatial separation of retailers. However, in his model, this increased separation of
downstream firms is driven by reduced entry into the retail industry. Furthermore, Dixit
focuses on a traditional analysis of the value of contractual vertical restraints (franchise
fees, royalties, etc.), in comparison with full integration, to a monopoly supplier.
Transaction cost aspects of integration are ignored.19
Since Ui and Di have a first mover advantage they will remain unintegrated, forcing U2 and D2
to incur the costs of merger.
From an overall producer perspective, individual incentives to integrate are too weak. As
stated above, for E > 9m + t non-integration is the equilibrium industry structure. The costs
of integration then exceed the competition and transport cost benefits of integration for the
individual firm. However, in making their integration decision, a given manufacturer-retailer
pair fail to internalise the competition benefits of merger to the rival retailer. Where 26m + t
> E > 8m + t, partial integration is optimal from an overall firm viewpoint, but will not be
sustained in equilibrium.
The key observation from this section is the emergence of an asymmetric partially integrated
industry structure for moderate competition, despite initially identical firms.
1/2 < A < 1
Competitive pressures in the downstream market are now strong, and profit reducing
interaction occurs unless Ds locate at opposite ends of the unit line.
A fear of lock-in still attracts non-integrated downstream firms towards the mid-point of the
unit line. Countering this, the competition effect encourages these firms to locate at the end-
points. Condition A again ensures that the lock-in threat dominates any competition effect
encouraging firms to locate at the endpoints. Independent downstream firms will therefore
always choose to locate at (=\/2.
Integrated downstream firms locate next to their upstream partners. Again, such location
avoids inefficient transport costs, and may eliminate downstream competition. The role of this
competition effect may be crucial, and depends delicately on integration patterns in the
industry as a whole.
To be precise, if firms Uj and Dj do not integrate, no competition benefits will follow from
integration of Ui and Di. Even if Di integrates with Ui and locates at (=0, competition between
downstream firms will not be eliminated, since non-integrated Dj continues to locate at 1=1/2
(and A > 1/2 !). However, if Uj and Dj are integrated, and Dj locates at (=1, then integration of
Ui and D, (in shifting Di's location from €=1/2 to ^=0) brings about the elimination of
downstream competition. The delicacy of this competition effect prevents a partially integrated
industry structure from emerging, as the following profit results make clear.20
Profits for U-D pairs (1/2 < A < 1) are given by:
Non-Integration: R\ju =(l-9)m-t
Partial Integration (by.Dj-Uj): nuj.Dj = (l-6)m-E
nui-Di = (l-6)m-t
Full integration: nu_D = m-E
It should be clear that with tough competition the partial integration structure will never
emerge in equilibrium. Integration by one upstream-downstream pair alone cannot reduce
competition. For E < 9m+1 both U-D pairs will integrate, while for E > 8m+1 both firms will
remain unintegrated.
Note that for intermediate E, where t < E < 0m+t, Ui and Di only integrate in anticipation
of merger by U2 and D2. Likewise, U2 and D2 will only integrate in response to DrUi merger.
Chains of integration are therefore observed.
These competition results are summarised below.
Proposition 5 [Competition and Integration]
For i < E < Qm + t , the competitive environment plays a critical role in determining
industry structure:
(i) In the absence of competitive forces (A = 0), both downstream firms will be non-
integrated.
(ii) Moderate competitive pressure (0 < A < 112) generates partially integrated outcomes i.e.
vertically integrated and non-integrated firms coexist.
(Hi) A fully vertically integrated industry emerges when downstream competitive pressures
are intense (112 < A < 1). Furthermore, a chain of integration is observed.
In our analysis of the basic model (with monopoly D) it was assumed that the downstream
firm was able to extract all consumer surplus generated by product sales. This allowed us to
focus on (upstream and downstream) producer surplus alone in assessing efficiency. However,
once competition between downstream firms is permitted, explicit consideration of consumers
is illuminating. In particular, it seems reasonable to suppose that at least a fraction of the
downstream profit dissipated through competition is passed on to consumers. Of course, it
could be argued that this profit is in fact expended on (wasteful and unsuccessful) attempts to
regain full market power. However, here we will assume that all revenues lost by firms as a
result of the competitive process accrue to consumers.
Once competition between downstream firms is initiated, we have seen that for a range of
merger costs E, integration takes place solely because this results in a reduction in that
competition. When t < E < 6m+1, integration occurs even though merger costs exceed the21
transport cost savings that result. In effect, the integrating firms in the industry are undertaking
costly merger simply to avoid making transfers to consumers. Clearly, integration in such
circumstances will be inefficient.
It should be pointed out that our analysis has been based on the assumption that consumers,
derive no added value from retailer separation. In general, consumers may benefit from the
greater variety offered by integration-induced retailer differentiation. Such considerations
would obviously affect our view of the efficiency implications of integration.
Finally, note that to simplify our analysis in this section, we have only considered single
product firms. Given our basic assumptions, this rules out foreclosure effects. However, the
changes in downstream location patterns induced by integration suggest that foreclosure
effects would be restored in a richer model. Furthermore, in a multi-product setting, retailers'
product portfolio choices may affect the intensity of inter-firm competition. This may further
encourage additional integration-induced foreclosure.
6. Conclusions
In this paper we have modelled a retailer's choices between two rival suppliers and between
single-product and multi-product retailing. An investment specificity decision must also be
taken - in the form of a discrete location choice. Vertical integration may encourage supplier-
specific location, where an independent retailer would choose general investment. Indeed,
costly merger will only take place if a change in the retailer's location decision is induced.
When single product retailing dominates, an independent retailer will always choose a general
location, thus minimising lock-in to a given supplier. However, in precisely these
circumstances a supplier-specific location is efficient. Vertical merger may then be attractive,
eliminating lock-in concerns and encouraging specific investment. Of course, such integration
will occur only if the benefits of appropriate investment outweigh the (exogenously given)
costs of merger. Whenever bilaterally attractive merger occurs, it will be efficient in this case.
Retailer supply patterns may be sensitive to the location decision. Integration can therefore
result in foreclosure of the non-integrated supplier. Whether this foreclosure is efficient or not
depends delicately on the inter-relationship between the relative merits of specific versus
general investment, and single versus multiproduct retailing. In the context of this simple
model we explore the interaction between efficiency and anti-competitive motives for vertical
integration.22
The basic model was extended to consider the impact of vertical integration on competition
between retailers. Such competition may motivate otherwise unattractive merger. Integration,
in encouraging supplier-specific investment, allows retailers to adopt competition-reducing
product differentiation strategies. For moderate levels of competition, a partially integrated
industry structure then results, as integration by a subset of firms is sufficient to reduce
rivalrous interaction. With tougher competition, a coordinated integration process is essential.
In this case, a fully vertically integrated industry results. The integration process then displays
the characteristics of an integration chain.23
Appendix (Proof of Lemma 1):
Here we derive the results of the supply competition process:
Non-integration
If unit 1 from Ui: value if both units from Ui = m
value if unit 2 from U2 = 2d-t2
winning supply price = 12d-t2-m .
If unit 1 from U2: value of unit 2 from Di = 2d-ti
value of both units from D2 = m
winning supply price = 12d-ti-m I.
If Ui offers unit 1 for pi and wins it gains: pi + max[0,m-2d+t2].
If Ui does not bid for the unit 1 contract it gains: max[0,2d-m-ti].
Indifference implies pi
11"** = max[0,m-2d+ti] - max[0,2d-m-t2].
If U2 supplies unit 1 at price P2 it gains: P2 + max[0,m-2d+ti].
If U2 loses the unit 1 contract it gains: max[0,2d-m-t2].
Indifference implies P2
ma
x = max[0,m-2d+t2] - max[0,2d-m-til.




x + min(d-t!,m-d), d-trpi
ma
x + min(d-t2)m-d)].
Let M = [d-ti-p,
ma
x + min(d-t2,m-d)] - [d-t2-p2
ma
x + min(d-ti,m-d)].
Substituting in the expressions for pi and p2 yields
M = (m-ti) - max[0, 2d-m-til - (m-t2) + max[0, 2d-m-t2]
If M>0 Ui wins the unit 1 supply contract. (Unit 1 from Ui in case of tie, by assumption).
If M<0 U2 supplies unit 1.
Now M = fm-t, - max(0,2d-m-ti)] - [m-t2 - tnax(0,2d-m-t2)l.
Some simple algebra yields
M = [m-d + min(m-d,d-ti)l - fm-d + min(m-d,d-t2)].
By assumption ti < t2, thus M > 0 and Ui always supplies unit 1.
Since M > 0, nD = m-d + min(m-d,d-t2).
Now, if D pays p* for unit 1 from Ui in equilibrium its profit is given by
nD = d-ti-p* + min[m-d, d-t2].24
However, we know that lip = m-d + min[m-d, d-t2J.
Consequently, unit 1 yields price = 2d-m-ti, and
unit 2 yields price = 12d-m-t21.
Ui supplies both units if d-t2 < m-d.
One unit is supplied by each U if d-t2 > m-d.
This is precisely the efficiency criterion, given location.
The payoffs are:
F1D = m-d + min[m-d,d-t2]
riy] = max[2d-m-ti, t2-ti]
= max[0,2d-m-t2].
Vertical Integration (D-Ui)
If we assume the same auction process then again input allocation will be efficient, given
location. The profit of U2 remains the same, while the combined profits of Ut and D are
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